Washington, U.C. 20505

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The Honorable David D. Newsom Under Secretary for Political Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release, 2005/01/13: CIA-RDP80B01554R003300190006-

29 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

Secretary of State Secretary of Defense

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Attached is a think piece which I believe you might find interesting. It discusses the kinds of pressures and inducements to which we believe Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council and the kidnappers would each most likely be responsive.

TANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment NFAC Memorandum, 29 Dec 1979

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

29 December 1979

MEMORANDUM

THE OUTLOOK OF KHOMEINI, THE FORCES OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TOWARDS PRESSURES OR INDUCEMENTS FROM THE US ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE

The US handling of the hostage crisis in Iran has been complicated from the start by the lack of any authoritative power center in Tehran. Three major actors—Ayotollah Khomeini, the forces occupying the Embassy, and the Revolutionary Council—have responded to US initiatives with conflicting statements which indicate a complicated pattern of political relationships.

- --Although both the forces occupying the Embassy and the Revolutionary Council are ultimately responsive to Khomeini's orders, Khomeini has apparently responded to events rather than having directed them.
- --The forces occupying the Embassy have rejected the authority of the Revolutionary Council and have dealt from a position of strength because of Khomeini's continuing support for the occupation. On the other hand, Revolutionary Council members have sustained direct access to Khomeini--which the

This paper was prepared in the Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Office of Strategic Research, and Office of Economic Research. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Iran Analytic Center, Office of Political Velicus 2005/01/13: CIA-RDP80B01554R003300190006-4

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25X1	28 Dec 1979
25X1	NOTE TO
25X1	Tell I would like to take home for the weekend a paper I
	had a while ago probably buried in all these documents I haven't read
()	on how we are planning to cope with societal change. Connected with that,
	I would like to take home a document that the DDCI submitted to the
2	Political Intelligence Working Group on Improved Political Intelligence
25X1	Both of the latter
	should be wittin the last few menths. I helieve

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Protecting the CIA

puts an agent in the field, it is taking the luctant to cooperate with the agency in any chance that the information it has given him may someday be used against it. It makes every effort it can, of course, to minimize the risk, including requiring its agents to agree in writing not to publish anything without agency approval after they leave.

In recent years, however, several incidents have suggested that those precautions are inadequate. According to CIA director Stansfield Turner, in a letter to Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen which the senator released this week, a number of former CIA officers "are avowedly determined to destroy the agency" by publicly revealing the names of agents stationed abroad.

The chief offender Turner cited, former agent Philip Agee, now living in Europe, has a new book called "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," which provides instructions for identifying and exposing CIA personnel and claims to name more than 700 agents in Europe alone.

All told, Agee has identified 1,200 individuals as agency operatives. Turner says, and he acknowledges that a substantial number of the identifications have been accurate.

The consequences of such publicity have naturally been disastrous for U.S. intelligence-gathering. Not only have the disclosures jeopardized the lives of the individtuals directly involved, as well as the lives of their foreign contacts, but they have also

Whenever the Central Intelligence Agency made potential sources understandably re-

These CIA turncoats, then-no milder term seems appropriate—are in effect, if not in fact, functioning as double agents, at the expense of their own country's security.

At present, however, there is no law specifically forbidding such unauthorized public identifications. Bentsen has introduced a bill which would make their acts a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and it awaits action by the Senate as a whole.

Such action is clearly essential. The CIA has been plagued with many problems over the past few years, many of them of its own making. But no intelligence organization, however superbly managed, could possibly continue to operate indefinitely under the conditions the present legal situation imposes. If this gaping hole is left unplugged, there can be little hope of the CIA's ever becoming the more effective intelligencegatherer its critics claim to want.

The Director

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28 December 1979

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Dear

Thanks for your memo of December 6th, in which you recommended that we here at the Agency set aside time for a prayer vigil for the hostages in Iran. Your recommendation helped us to form the program we held in the auditorium on National Unity Day on December 18th.

Again, thanks for giving us your thoughts on how we in the Agency might express our support and prayers for our fellow Americans being detained in Iran.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

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Room 3D 5332 CIA Headquarters